Fulfilled Expectations Cournot Duopoly with Information Acquisition and Release

William Novshek · Hugo Sonnenschein

308 citations0/0 files storedThe Bell Journal of Economics

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Merger and Competition Analysis Game Theory and Applications Auction Theory and Applications

Abstract

This article studies the fulfilled expectations equilibrium for a Cournot duopoly model in which firms acquire information about uncertain linear demand. Several propositions are established concerning the incentives to acquire and release information in this duopoly environment.

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1982Strategic Information Transmission 2020Researches into the Mathematical Principles of the Theory of Wealth

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1990Trade Association Disclosure Rules, Incentives to Share Information, and Welfare 1997Competitive Disadvantage and Discretionary Disclosure in Industries 1988Trade Associations as Information Exchange Mechanisms 1995Bertrand Competition when Rivals' Costs are Unknown 1988Aggregation of Information in Large Cournot Markets 2002Information Transparency in Electronic Marketplaces: Why Data Transparency May Hinder the Adoption of B2B Exchanges 1993Information Sharing in Oligopoly: The Truth-Telling Problem 1986Common Knowledge, Consensus, and Aggregate Information

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