The Ontology of Collective Action

Abstract

This chapter argues that there are no group agents. It grants that we typically speak as if there were group agents, as when we attribute actions to corporations or blame a group for a collective action. The chapter argues, however, that the claims we make do not logically imply the existence of group agents. The chapter’s argument revolves around a semantics that he provides for the relevant kinds of claims that does not involve any quantification over group agents. A further implication of the proposed semantics is that there can be unintentional collective actions such that none of the individuals involved have any intention to perform their individual actions as part of a collective action. Interestingly, this puts this chapter’s theory at odds with those who made joint intentions and/or individual intentions the cornerstone(s) of their theories.

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