Extended knowledge and social epistemology

Abstract

The place of social epistemology within contemporary philosophy, as \nwell as its relation to other academic disciplines, is the topic of an \nongoing debate. One camp within that debate holds that social \nepistemology should be pursued strictly from within the perspective of \nindividualistic analytic epistemology. In contrast, a second camp holds \nthat social epistemology is an interdisciplinary field that should be \ngiven priority over traditional analytic epistemology, with the specific \naim of radically transforming the latter to fit the results and \nmethodology of the former. We are rather suspicious of this apparent \ntension, which we believe can be significantly mitigated by paying \nattention to certain recent advances within philosophy of mind and \ncognitive science. Accordingly, we attempt to explain how extended \nknowledge, the result of combining active externalism from \ncontemporary philosophy of mind with contemporary epistemology, \ncan offer an alternative conception of the future of social epistemology.

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