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The Reliability of Epistemic Intuitions
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The Reliability of Epistemic Intuitions (2014)The Reliability of Epistemic IntuitionsMindreaders: The Cognitive Basis of "Theory of Mind" (2010)Mindreaders: The Cognitive Ba…Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition (2021)Radical Skepticism and Episte…Much at stake in knowledge (2020)Much at stake in knowledgeLingering stereotypes: Salience bias in philosophical argument (2019)Lingering stereotypes: Salien…Philosophical expertise under the microscope (2018)Philosophical expertise under…Religious Disagreement and Epistemic Intuitions (2017)Religious Disagreement and Ep…Doxastic Justification is Fundamental (2017)Doxastic Justification is Fun…A solution to knowledge’s threshold problem (2016)A solution to knowledge’s thr…Where Philosophical Intuitions Come From (2014)Where Philosophical Intuition…The universal core of knowledge (2014)The universal core of knowled…Knowledge in and out of Contrast (2014)Knowledge in and out of Contr…Knowledge and Its Limits (2000)Knowledge and its Limits (2002)Knowledge and Practical Interests (2005)Gettier Across Cultures 1 (2015)From Paradigm-Based Explanation to Pragmatic Genealogy (2018)The Practical Origins of Ideas (2021)The need for cognition. (1982)Relevance: Communication and Cognition (1986)Cognitive Reflection and Decision Making (2005)Truth and assertion: rules versus aims (2018)Salient Alternatives in Perspective (2020)An Essay concerning Human Understanding (1690)Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment, and Social Cognition (2007)RELIGIOUS DISAGREEMENT: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY AMONG ACADEMIC PHILOSOPHERS (2015)The Epistemic Value of Speculative Fiction (2015)The Ontology of Musical Works and the Role of Intuitions: An Experimental Study (2017)Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment. (1983)Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. (1984)Thinking, Fast and Slow (2011)Knowledge as Justified True Belief (2021)The Structure of Defeat (2021)Warrant and Proper Function (1993)Warranted Christian Belief (2000)Ethics Without Principles (2004)Dissenting Church (2024)Naming and Necessity (1972)Epiphenomenal Qualia (1982)11. Reasons and Persons (1986)Expert or Esoteric? Philosophers Attribute Knowledge Differently Than All Other Academics (2020)Forming Impressions (2020)Why Variation Matters to Philosophy (2022)Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and probability (1973)KNOWLEDGE AND LOTTERIES (2005)Stakes, Scales, and Skepticism (2019)Reconciling scientific and commonsense values to improve reasoning (2021)Minds, brains, and programs (1980)Estimating the reproducibility of psychological science (2015)What is “theory of mind”? Concepts, cognitive processes and individual differences (2012)Submentalizing: I Am Not Really Reading Your Mind (2014)The Anatomy of Friendship (2017)
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References

  • 2010Mindreaders: The Cognitive Basis of "Theory of Mind"476 cited

Cited by

  • 2014Knowledge in and out of Contrast55 cited
  • 2014Where Philosophical Intuitions Come From49 cited
  • 2014The universal core of knowledge42 cited
  • 2018Philosophical expertise under the microscope37 cited
  • 2017Doxastic Justification is Fundamental31 cited
  • 2021Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition31 cited
  • 2016A solution to knowledge’s threshold problem27 cited
  • 2017Religious Disagreement and Epistemic Intuitions25 cited
  • 2020Much at stake in knowledge23 cited
  • 2019Lingering stereotypes: Salience bias in philosophical argument20 cited

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