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On a policy of transferring public patients to private practice
10 references·0 citing·46 second hop
On a policy of transferring public patients to private practice (2004)On a policy of transferring public patien…Should physicians' dual practice be limited? An incentive approach (2004)Should physicians' dual pract…Public health care with waiting time: the role of supplementary private health care (2003)Public health care with waiti…Shifting public-health-sector waiting lists to the private sector (2002)Shifting public-health-sector…Creaming, skimping and dumping: provider competition on the intensive and extensive margins (1998)Creaming, skimping and dumpin…H ealth C are P ayment S ystems : C ost and Q uality I ncentives (1994)H ealth C are P ayment S yste…The doctor as double agent: Information asymmetry, health insurance, and medical care (1991)The doctor as double agent: I…Optimal payment systems for health services (1990)Optimal payment systems for h…A model of capitation (1990)A model of capitationRate-Setting by Diagnosis Related Groups and Hospital Specialization (1987)Rate-Setting by Diagnosis Rel…Provider behavior under prospective reimbursement (1986)Provider behavior under prosp…TOWARD A THEORY OF NON-PROFIT INSTITUTIONS: AN ECONOMIC MODEL OF A HOSPITAL (1969)Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship (1979)Doctors and Their Workshops (1980)Reimbursing Health Plans and Health Providers: Efficiency in Production versus Selection (1996)Chapter 11 The anatomy of health insurance (2000)Physician Agency (2000)The Bargaining Problem (1950)Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model (1982)Incentives and provider payment methods (1995)Moral Hazard and Risk Spreading in Partnerships (1995)UNCERTAINTY AND THE WELFARE ECONOMICS OF MEDICAL CARE (2003)How payment systems affect physicians’ provision behaviour—An experimental investigation (2011)Richard A. Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance -A Study in Public Economy, New York, 1959 (1960)The demand for private health insurance: do waiting lists matter? (1999)Waiting Lists and Patient Selection (2005)Introducing competition in healthcare services: The role of private care and increased patient mobility (2013)Competition and The Operational Performance of Hospitals: The Role of Hospital Objectives (2015)The demand for private health insurance: do waiting lists matter? (2017)Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach (1968)A re-examination of the meaning and importance of supplier-induced demand (1994)Chapter 2 An overview of the normative economics of the health sector (2000)Moral hazard in physician prescription behavior (2000)Uncertainty and The Welfare Economics of Medical Care (2001)Medical insurance: A case study of the tradeoff between risk spreading and appropriate incentives (1970)Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information (1976)The Anatomy of Health Insurance (1999)Chapter 14 Risk adjustment in competitive health plan markets (2000)Hospital Competition and Quality with Regulated Prices* (2011)Monopoly, Quality, and Regulation (1975)A Theory of Yardstick Competition (1985)Hospital nonprice competition and medicare reimbursement policy (1989)Chapter 20 The industrial organization of health care markets (2000)The Economics of Specialty Hospitals (2008)The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise (1980)How Payment Systems Affect Physicians' Provision Behavior - An Experimental Investigation (2009)Research trends in contemporary health economics: a scientometric analysis on collective content of specialty journals (2024)Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design (1991)Public and private health‐care financing with alternate public rationing rules (2010)A theoretical approach to dual practice regulations in the health sector (2012)Informal Payments in Developing Countries' Public Health Sectors (2012)Queueing Models for Hospital Waiting Lists (1987)Cash versus Kind, Self-selection, and Efficient Transfers (1988)Public Provision of Private Goods and the Redistribution of Income (1991)Tax/subsidy and capacity decisions in a two-tier health system with welfare redistributive objective (2016)Hospital response to prospective payment: Moral hazard, selection, and practice-style effects (1996)Contracting for health services when patient demand does not reflect quality (1998)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1986Provider behavior under prospective reimbursement724 cited
  • 1998Creaming, skimping and dumping: provider competition on the intensive and extensive margins482 cited
  • 1994H ealth C are P ayment S ystems : C ost and Q uality I ncentives367 cited
  • 1990Optimal payment systems for health services321 cited
  • 1991The doctor as double agent: Information asymmetry, health insurance, and medical care280 cited
  • 1987Rate-Setting by Diagnosis Related Groups and Hospital Specialization125 cited
  • 2003Public health care with waiting time: the role of supplementary private health care115 cited
  • 2004Should physicians' dual practice be limited? An incentive approach87 cited
  • 1990A model of capitation68 cited
  • 2002Shifting public-health-sector waiting lists to the private sector46 cited

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