The Dissent Voting Behaviour of Bank of England MPC Members

Abstract

I examine the propensity of Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee (BoEMPC) members to cast dissenting votes. In particular, I compare the type and frequency of dissenting votes cast by socalled insiders (members of the committee chosen from within the ranks of bank staff) and outsiders (committee members chosen from outside the ranks of bank staff). Significant differences in the dissent voting behaviour associated with these groups is evidenced. Outsiders are significantly more likely to dissent than insiders; however, whereas outsiders tend to dissent on the side of monetary ease, insiders do so on the side of monetary tightness. I also seek to rationalise why such differences might arise, and in particular, why BoEMPC members might be incentivised to dissent. Amongst other factors, the impact of career backgrounds on dissent voting is examined. Estimates from logit analysis suggest that the effect of career backgrounds is negligible.

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