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Central-Bank Independence, Economic Behavior, and Optimal Term Lengths · Study

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ArticleCentral-Bank Independence, Economic Behavior, and Optimal Term Lengths

Christopher J. Waller1997

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Articlegreen1997

Central-Bank Independence, Economic Behavior, and Optimal Term Lengths

Christopher J. Waller · Carl E. Walsh

95 citations·0/0 files stored·American Economic Review

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Monetary Policy and Economic Impact Banking stability, regulation, efficiency Economic theories and models

Abstract

Central-bank independence, economic behavior, and optimal term lengths

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References

1993Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence 1992Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes 1987Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Repeated Game 1995Optimal contracts for central bankers 1994THE INTERNAL ORGANIZATION OF GOVERNMENT 1993Designing institutions for monetary stability 1988Voting on the Budget Deficit 1988Voting on the Budget Deficit

Cited by

1999Chapter 22 Political economics and macroeconomic policy 2001Monetary Policy in the Euro Area: Strategy and Decision-Making at the European Central Bank 2003Accountability, Transparency, and Inflation Targeting 1998Optimal Inflation Contracts and Inflation Targets with Uncertain Central Bank Preferences: Accountability Through Independence?2006Optimal Central Bank Design: Benchmarks for the ECB 1997CENTRAL BANKING AS A POLITICAL PRINCIPAL‐AGENT PROBLEM

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Details

Year1997

Typearticle

Published1997-02-17

VenueAmerican Economic Review

ISSN-L0002-8282

Languageen

Citations95

Files0 public / 0

ShelfMonetary Policy and Economic Impact

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openalex_workW1594790040

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2010Central Bank Independence, Transparency, and Accountability

2007Should the individual voting records of central bankers be published?