The Political Management of Mayors in Post-Deng China

Abstract

This article examines how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) maintains political control over municipal elites in post-Deng China. First, it analyses the career paths of mayors for all prefecture-level municipalities between 1990 and 2000. It then shows how the dual processes of economic decentralization and the decentralization of the personnel management system has not led to a decline of the CCP's capacity to enforce key organizational norms. An ordered probit model of cadre promotion suggests that the economic performance of cities has little substantive impact on promotion or removal from office. However, strict enforcement of cadre retirement regulations has the effect of shortening the tenure of mayors, which facilitates the promotion of a greater share of secondary officials than was possible before the reforms of the personnel system, but weakens the link between good governance and political rewards.

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