Central bank independence, centralization of wage bargaining, inflation and unemployment:Alex Cukierman A, Francesco Lippi1999-06-01articleEuropean Economic Review416 citationsclosedNo readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.Monetary Policy and Economic ImpactLabor Movements and UnionsLabor market dynamics and wage inequalityAbstractNo abstract was published for this record.Citations in this libraryStored only when both papers are in the corpus — 416 citations exist upstream.References1977Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans1985The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target1988Bargaining Structure, Corporatism and Macroeconomic Performance1983A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model1981A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural-Rate Model1997Unemployment and Labor Market Rigidities: Europe versus North America1992Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes1992Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and EvidenceCited by2008Central bank independence and monetary policymaking institutions — Past, present and future2002C ORPORATISM : The Past, Present, and Future of a Concept1998Immediate challenges for the European Central Bank2007Social Interactions in High School: Lessons from an Earthquake2006Banks’ riskiness over the business cycle: a panel analysis on Italian intermediaries2000The Nonneutrality of Monetary Policy with Large Price or Wage Setters*2001Varieties of Corporate Governance: Comparing Germany and the UK1999Partially Independent Central Banks, Politically Responsive Governments, and Inflation