Constructing the U.S. rapprochement with China, 1961-1974: from "red menace" to "tacit ally"

Abstract

Part I. Competing Discourses, 1961-8: 1. 'Red menance' to 'revolutionary rival': re-casting the Chinese communist threat 2. 'Troubled modernizer' but 'resurgent power': revisionist images of the PRC and arguments for a new China policy 3. The revisionist legacy: the discourse of reconciliation with China by 1968 Part II. Discursive Transitions, 1969-71: 4. Nixon's public China policy discourse in context 5. Debating the rapprochement: 'resurgent revolutionary power' vs. 'threatened realist power' Part III. Discourses of Rapprochement in Practice, 1971-4: 6. 'Principled realist power': laying the discursive foundations of a new relationship, July 1971 to February 1972 7. Principles in practice: policy implications of the decision for rapprochement 8. 'Selling' the relationship: the Nixon Administration's justification of the New China policy 9. 'Tacit ally' June 1972 to 1974: consolidating or saving the US-China rapprochement.

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