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Combinatorial auctions with k-wise dependent valuations
16 references·1 citing·21 second hop
Combinatorial auctions with k-wise dependent valuations (2005)Combinatorial auctions with k-wise depend…Combinatorial Auctions (2014)Combinatorial AuctionsThe Lovely but Lonely Vickrey Auction (2005)The Lovely but Lonely Vickrey…The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices (2005)The communication requirement…BOB: Improved winner determination in combinatorial auctions and generalizations (2003)BOB: Improved winner determin…Winner determination in combinatorial auction generalizations (2002)Winner determination in combi…Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions (2002)Truth revelation in approxima…Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding (2002)Ascending Auctions with Packa…Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions (2002)Algorithm for optimal winner …Bidding and allocation in combinatorial auctions (2000)Bidding and allocation in com…Truth Revelation in Rapid, Approximately Efficient Combinatorial Auctions (1999)Truth Revelation in Rapid, Ap…i Bundle (1999)i BundleComputationally Manageable Combinational Auctions (1998)Computationally Manageable Co…Why Are Vickrey Auctions Rare? (1990)Why Are Vickrey Auctions Rare?Incentives in Teams (1973)Incentives in TeamsMultipart pricing of public goods (1971)Multipart pricing of public g…COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS (1961)COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS,…Combinatorial auctions with restricted complements (2012)Combinatorial auctions with r…Optimal Auction Design (1981)Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions (2008)Approximate mechanism design without money (2009)A Course in Game Theory (1994)Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms (2000)A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding (1982)The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics (2002)Matching with Contracts (2005)10.1016/b978-044488002-4/50004-x (2000)Algorithmic Mechanism Design (2001)Combinatorial Auctions: A Survey (2003)Core-selecting package auctions (2007)Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing (2010)Computational Aspects of Cooperative Game Theory (2012)Towards a universal test suite for combinatorial auction algorithms (2000)Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities (2005)The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (2001)Putting Auction Theory to Work (2004)Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations (2009)2. Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research (1995)What Have We Learned from Market Design? (2008)
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References

  • 1961COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS7,719 cited
  • 1973Incentives in Teams3,334 cited
  • 1971Multipart pricing of public goods3,266 cited
  • 1998Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions1,024 cited
  • 2014Combinatorial Auctions923 cited
  • 2002Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions913 cited
  • 2002Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions658 cited
  • 2002Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding557 cited
  • 2005The Lovely but Lonely Vickrey Auction544 cited
  • 2000Bidding and allocation in combinatorial auctions531 cited
  • 1990Why Are Vickrey Auctions Rare?383 cited
  • 2005The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices261 cited
  • 2002Winner determination in combinatorial auction generalizations226 cited
  • 1999Truth Revelation in Rapid, Approximately Efficient Combinatorial Auctions223 cited
  • 1999i Bundle215 cited
  • 2003BOB: Improved winner determination in combinatorial auctions and generalizations144 cited

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  • 2012Combinatorial auctions with restricted complements42 cited