Reportbronze2000

Designing Financial Safety Nets to Fit Country Circumstances

96 citations0/0 files storedWorld Bank, Washington, DC eBooks

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Banking stability, regulation, efficiency Global Financial Crisis and Policies Global Financial Regulation and Crises

Abstract

Designing Financial SafetyFor optimal regulation, one size does not fit all. Nets to Fit CountryDifferences in countries' Circum stances informational and contracting environments-in the transparency of information, EdwardJ.Kane in protections for counterparties, and in political accountability-influence the design of their financial safety nets and their strategies for managing the breakdown of those nets.

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References

1976Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure 1983Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity 1984Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring 1996Theory of the firm; managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure 1992Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effect on Policy Outcomes 2000Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity 1996Bank Soundness and Macroeconomic Policy 1993THEORY OF RISK CAPITAL IN FINANCIAL FIRMS

Cited by

2002Bank Safety and Soundness and the Structure of Bank Supervision: A Cross‐Country Analysis 2011What Drives Acquisitions in the EU Banking Industry? The Role of Bank Regulation and Supervision Framework, Bank Specific and Market Specific Factors 2011Financial Frictions, Bank Efficiency and Risk: Evidence from the Eurozone 2004Banking crises and the design of safety nets 2010Depositor Behavior under Macroeconomic Risk: Evidence from Bank Runs in Emerging Economies 2002International evidence on the value of deposit insurance 2002Pricing of Deposit Insurance 2008Pricing of Deposit Insurance

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