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An Empirical Analysis of CEO Employment Contracts: What Do Top Executives Bargain For? · Study

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PreprintAn Empirical Analysis of CEO Employment Contracts: What Do Top Executives Bargain For?

Stewart Jon Schwab2004

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Preprintgreen2004

An Empirical Analysis of CEO Employment Contracts: What Do Top Executives Bargain For?

Stewart Jon Schwab · Randall S. Thomas

20 citations·0/0 files stored·SSRN Electronic Journal

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Corporate Finance and Governance Corporate Governance and Law Human Resource and Talent Management

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2013The prevention of excess managerial risk taking 2006CEO Tenure, Performance and Turnover in S&P 500 Companies 2012Executive Compensation in India 2011Marital Prenups? A Look at CEO Severance Agreements 2005Keeping the Board in the Dark: CEO Compensation and Entrenchment

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Year2004

Typepreprint

Published2004-01-01

VenueSSRN Electronic Journal

ISSN-L1556-5068

Languageen

Citations20

Files0 public / 0

ShelfCorporate Finance and Governance

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doi10.2139/ssrn.529923

openalex_workW1603586733

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