For better or worse: The roles of power in models of distribution within marriage

Abstract

Writers from diverse intellectual traditions inside and outside the social sciences criticize neoclassical economics for neglecting Their criticisms focus on economists' analyses of labor markets and of distribution within families; Marxists and feminists are among the leading critics. The classic definitions of power come from sociology and political science and, not surprisingly, resonate more for sociologists and political scientists than for economists. Instead of discussing lofty abstract definitions, I stay near the ground and focus on a concrete application: specifically, distribution within marriage and, more generally, distribution between women and men. Economists have three alternative models of distribution within marriage: Gary Becker's altruist model, cooperative bargaining models, and noncooperative bargaining models. The altruist model remains the leader. Becker's model implies that the equilibrium distribution maximizes the utility of the altruist (the husband, father, dictator, patriarch) subject to the family's resource constraint. Becker does not describe the altruist model in game-theoretic terms, but I have argued elsewhere (Pollak, 1985) that his model can be interpreted as a twostage bargaining game in which the altruist moves first and confronts other family members with take-it-or-leave-it choices. The game-theoretic interpretation makes it clear that the crucial postulate of the model is not the altruism of Becker's altruist, but his position in the game-one is tempted to say, his power. Altruism does play a role in Becker's model: the altruism of the altruist (the assumption that his utility is an increasing function of his wife's utility or consumption) allows the model to have an equilibrium in which the wife receives more than her reservation level of utility. Within the past 15 years, Becker's altruist model has been challenged by models that explicitly view distribution within marriage as the solution to a cooperative or a noncooperative game. Cooperative bargaining models are exemplified by the divorcethreat models of Marilyn Manser and Murray Brown (1980) and of Marjorie B. McElroy and Mary J. Horney (1981) and by the model of Shelly Lundberg and myself (1993). All of these models use the Nash bargaining solution or a similar axiomatic solution concept to obtain a unique equilibrium corresponding to a point, which specifies the payoffs the players receive if they fail to reach an agreement. In divorce-threat models the threat point is the utility each spouse would receive in the event of divorce; thus, the threat point is external to the marriage. In the separate-spheres model, the threat point is internal to the marriage and, more specifically, is the equilibrium of a noncooperative game in which the quantities of household public goods are determined by voluntary contributions by the spouses. Noncooperative models of distribution within marriage, aside from Becker's altruist model, are less common than cooperative models. Ravi Kanbur and L awrence Haddad (1994) analyze intrahousehold allocation using a Rubinstein alternating-offer game. Lundberg and I (1994) discuss a repeated game in which the voluntary-contri* Department of Economics, University of Washington, Seattle, WA, 98195. This paper is based on a longer manuscript entitled Taking Power Seriously. I am grateful to Jere R. Behrman, Douglas H. Blair, Paula England, Nancy Folbre, Margaret Levi, Shelly Lundberg, Jane J. Mansbridge, Julie A. Nelson, Mark Rosenzweig, Dick Startz, and Diana Strassmann for helpful conversations and to Judith Goff for editorial assistance.

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