The Logical Problem of Evil: Mackie and Plantinga

Daniel Howard‐Snyder

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Theology and Philosophy of Evil Philosophical Ethics and Theory Study and Philosophy of Religion

Abstract

J.L. Mackie's version of the logical problem of evil is a failure, as even he came to recognize. Contrary to current mythology, however, its failure was not established by Alvin Plantinga's Free Will Defense. That is because a defense is successful only if it is not reasonable to refrain from believing any of the claims that constitute it, but it is reasonable to refrain from believing the central claim of Plantinga's Free Will Defense, namely the claim that, possibly, every essence suffers from transworld depravity.

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1955IV.—EVIL AND OMNIPOTENCE 1989Pain and Pleasure: An Evidential Problem for Theists 2006The Internet encyclopedia of philosophy 1991The Inductive Argument From Evil and the Human Cognitive Condition 1997The Evidential Argument from Evil 20014.1 'THE PROBLEM OF EVIL AND SOME VARIETIES OF ATHEISM'1963Hume on Evil 1985Plantinga on the Problem of Evil

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