Articlegreen2013

KEPUTUSAN STRUKTUR MODAL DAN KEBIJAKAN DIVIDEN SEBAGAI MEKANISME MENGURANGI MASALAH KEAGENAN

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Corporate Finance and Governance Financial Analysis and Corporate Governance Corporate Governance and Financial Management

Abstract

Perilaku oportunistik manajerial pada keputusan pendanaan perusahaan menimbulkan konflik antara manajemen dan pemegang saham maupun kreditur. Tujuan penelitian ini adalah mengetahui secara empiris pengaruh kepemilikan manajerial (hipotesis masalah keagenan) yang dipengaruhi oleh debt equity ratio dan dividend payout ratio yang akan mengurangi masalah keagenan. Penelitian dilakukan pada perusahaan manufaktur yang tercatat di Bursa Efek Indonesia tahun 2008 sampai dengan 2011. Berdasarkan dua model regresi yang dipergunakan, diperoleh hasil bahwa kepemilikan manajerial berpengaruh positif terhadap debt equity ratio yang merupakan indikasi bahwa dengan peningkatan utang maka akan meningkatkan monitoring yang dilakukan kreditur terhadap perilaku manajerial. Selain itu ditemukan hasil yang tidak signifikan pengaruh kepemilikan manajerial terhadap dividend payout ratio yang merupakan indikasi inkonsisten dengan masalah keagenan. The managerial opportunistic behaviour on the financing activity decision can generate a conflict between the management and the stockholder or creditor as a consequence of the opportunity management behaviors. This paper aims to provide empirical evidence on the managerial ownership (agency costs hypothesis) which suggests debt equity ratio and dividend payout ratio may reduce agency costs. This research was conducted at manufacturing firms listed at Indonesian Stock Exchange from 2008 to 2011. In this research, two regression models were used. Management ownership is positively associated with debt equity ratio. It indicates that the increase of monitoring, done by creditors, due to the increasing amount of debt. However, there is not a significant relationship between management ownership and dividend payout ratio, it indicates that the finding is inconsistent with the agency conflict.

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References

1976Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure 1986Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers 1999Corporate Ownership Around the World 1985THE HUMAN SIDE OF ENTERPRISE 1973The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem.1995Relationship Lending and Lines of Credit in Small Firm Finance 1984Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends 1998Corporate Ownership Around the World

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