The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism
Abstract
This chapter describes what may be an adequate rational defense for theism against any argument for atheism based on the existence of evil. It discusses the position of friendly atheism. In developing the argument for atheism based on the existence of evil, it will be useful to focus on some particular evil that our world contains in considerable abundance. Intense human and animal suffering, for example, occurs daily and in great plenitude in our world. If one is persuaded by the argument for atheism how might one best view the position of the theist. If no one can be rationally justified in believing a false proposition then friendly atheism is a paradoxical, if not incoherent position. But surely the truth of a belief is not a necessary condition of someone’s being rationally justified in having that belief.
Cite this
William L. Rowe (2017). The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism. Routledge eBooks. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315234021-5
@article{l2017the,
title = {The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism},
author = {Rowe, William L.},
year = {2017},
journal = {Routledge eBooks},
doi = {10.4324/9781315234021-5}
}Citations in this library
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