Rwanda in Retrospect

Abstract

In a close examination of what a realistic US military intervention could have achieved in the 1994 genocide case in Rwanda the claim that 5000 US ground troops deployed at the outset of the killing could have prevented the genocide was found insupportable. This claim was originally made by the UN commanding general in Rwanda during the genocide and has since been endorsed by members of the Congress human rights groups and a distinguished panel of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict. However it is noted that although some lives could have been saved by intervention even a large force deployed immediately upon the onset of the killings could not saved even half of the ultimate victims. This paper discusses in detail the 1994 Rwandan genocide which left hundreds of thousands of Tutsi dead. It examines three levels of potential US military intervention: maximum moderate and minimal. Moreover it cites several important lessons from the Rwandan experience for policy-makers in pursuing prevention or intervention. Overall it is noted that the most obvious lesson of Rwandas tragedy is that intervention is no substitute for prevention.

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