Corrective Justice for Civil Recourse Theorists

Abstract

According to the dominant view, corrective requires that we reverse wrongful transactions, so that a victim is made whole, or put in the position she would have been in absent wrongdoing. In this paper, I argue that this can’t be the fundamental demand of corrective justice, as much of the time we aren’t in a position to do it, or anything like it. Instead, I argue that we should understand corrective justice on a model of “getting even” rather than “making whole.” Along the way, I explore the continuity between remedial practices in tort law and revenge as a response to wrongdoing. Finally, I contend that the civil recourse view of tort law is not an alternative to a corrective justice theory of the institution; it is a corrective justice theory, and a better one than the more familiar sort.

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