Legal Irritants: How Unifying Law Ends up in New Divergences

Abstract

Abstract Recent attempts at institutional transfer of legal rules from one production regime to the other seem to produce a double irritation in the new context. As the case of transfer of continental rules on ‘good faith’ demonstrates, foreign rules are irritants not only in relation to the domestic legal discourse itself but also in relation to the economic institutions to which law is closely coupled. They force the domestic law to a reconstruction in the network of its distinctions, while provoking the economic institutions to a reconstruction of their own. Thus, they trigger two different series of events whose interaction leads to an evolutionary dynamics, which may find a new equilibrium in the eigenvalues of the legal and economic institutions involved. The result of such a complex and turbulent process is rarely a convergence of the participating legal orders, rather the creation of new cleavages in the interrelation of legal and economic institutions.

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