The politics of de‐delegation: Regulatory (in)dependence in Turkey

Abstract

Abstract This essay explores the rise and decline of regulatory independence in Turkey. Framing the ongoing process of limiting independence of these agencies as the politics of de‐delegation, it raises the question of why Turkish regulatory agencies have become subject to increasing political intervention. Contending that institutional legacies and mounting illiberal predispositions of the Turkish state facilitate the politics of de‐delegation, the essay focuses on centralization, executive discretion, and politicization of bureaucracy as the major institutional legacies. Then it briefly discusses formal and informal mechanisms of political intervention, which have impaired the independence of the regulatory agencies.

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