Ownership and Allocation of Capital: Evidence from 44 Countries

Johan Erik Eklund · Sameeksha Desai

21 citations0/0 files storedJournal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE

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Corporate Finance and Governance Financial Markets and Investment Strategies Finance, Markets, and Regulation

Abstract

In an efficient economy, capital should be quickly (re)allocated from declining firms and sectors to more profitable investment opportunities. This process is affected by the concentration of corporate control, which in turn is affected by market institutions. We employ a panel of 11,984 firms across 44 countries to estimate the functional efficiency of capital markets. We adapt a measure for the efficiency of capital allocation using the accelerator principle. Our empirical results show weak property rights and highly concentrated ownership reduce the functional efficiency of capital markets.

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1976Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure 2003The Theory of Economic Development 1998Law and Finance 1999Corporate Ownership Around the World 1997Legal Determinants of External Finance 1933The Modern Corporation and Private Property 1988Management ownership and market valuation 2000Investor protection and corporate governance

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