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Scoring Imprecise Credences: A Mildly Immodest Proposal
16 references·7 citing·38 second hop
Scoring Imprecise Credences: A Mildly Immodest Proposal (2016)Scoring Imprecise Credences: A Mildly Imm…Social Epistemology: Essential Readings (2011)Social Epistemology: Essentia…An Objective Justification of Bayesianism I: Measuring Inaccuracy (2010)An Objective Justification of…A DEFENSE OF IMPRECISE CREDENCES IN INFERENCE AND DECISION MAKING1 (2010)A DEFENSE OF IMPRECISE CREDEN…Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief (2008)Accuracy and Coherence: Prosp…Justifying Conditionalization: Conditionalization Maximizes Expected Epistemic Utility (2006)Justifying Conditionalization…How Probabilities Reflect Evidence (2005)How Probabilities Reflect Evi…Epistemic Permissiveness (2005)Epistemic PermissivenessEvidentialism (2004)EvidentialismThe Rationality of Belief and Some Other Propositional Attitudes (2002)The Rationality of Belief and…A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism (1998)A Nonpragmatic Vindication of…Dutch-Book Arguments Depragmatized: Epistemic Consistency For Partial Believers (1996)Dutch-Book Arguments Depragma…On Indeterminate Probabilities (1974)On Indeterminate ProbabilitiesUtility Theory for Decision Making (1971)Utility Theory for Decision M…Choice Functions and Revealed Preference (1971)Choice Functions and Revealed…UTILITY THEORY FOR DECISION MAKING (1970)UTILITY THEORY FOR DECISION M…La prévision : ses lois logiques, ses sources subjectives (1937)La prévision : ses lois logiq…Taking Risks, With and Without Probabilities (2025)Taking Risks, With and Withou…A unified treatment of risk and ambiguity within a rank-dependent framework (2025)A unified treatment of risk a…Ignorance and Moral Responsibility (2022)Ignorance and Moral Responsib…Dilating and contracting arbitrarily (2020)Dilating and contracting arbi…ACCURACY AND UR-PRIOR CONDITIONALIZATION (2018)ACCURACY AND UR-PRIOR CONDITI…When propriety is improper (2017)When propriety is improperThe Accuracy and Rationality of Imprecise Credences (2015)The Accuracy and Rationality …Semiorders and a Theory of Utility Discrimination (1956)Rational Choice Functions and Orderings (1959)Social Choice Theory: A Re-Examination (1977)Valuing Freedoms (2002)Preference, Value, Choice, and Welfare (2011)Theory of games and economic behavior (2019)Probability and Evidence. (1973)Laws and symmetry (1989)Betting on Theories (1993)An Objective Justification of Bayesianism II: The Consequences of Minimizing Inaccuracy (2010)The Humean Theory of Motivation (1987)The Possibility of Practical Reason (1996)Putting Logic in its Place (2004)BELIEF IS CREDENCE ONE (IN CONTEXT) (2013)Accuracy and the Laws of Credence (2016)A Subjectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance (1980)Scientific reasoning: the Bayesian approach (1990)An Epistemic Nonconsequentialism (2020)Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. (1955)Change in View: Principles of Reasoning. (1987)Laws and Symmetry (1989)Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy (2009)The Importance of Being Rational (2018)Learning to Be Overconfident (2001)The Adaptive Markets Hypothesis (2004)Sensitivity analysis: A review of recent advances (2015)The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice (1981)Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior (1989)Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review (2002)A ‘soft’ measure of consensus in the setting of partial (fuzzy) preferences (1988)What Conditional Probability Could Not Be (2003)Permission to Believe: Why Permissivism Is True and What It Tells Us About Irrelevant Influences on Belief (2012)On Economic Inequality (1973)The structure of random utility models (1977)The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice (1985)Justification without Awareness (2006)On the Relationship between Propositional and Doxastic Justification (2010)Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions (2013)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1971Utility Theory for Decision Making2,460 cited
  • 1937La prévision : ses lois logiques, ses sources subjectives1,649 cited
  • 1970UTILITY THEORY FOR DECISION MAKING1,614 cited
  • 1971Choice Functions and Revealed Preference775 cited
  • 1998A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism774 cited
  • 2004Evidentialism586 cited
  • 1974On Indeterminate Probabilities547 cited
  • 2005Epistemic Permissiveness544 cited
  • 2006Justifying Conditionalization: Conditionalization Maximizes Expected Epistemic Utility385 cited
  • 2008Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief332 cited
  • 2011Social Epistemology: Essential Readings308 cited
  • 2010A DEFENSE OF IMPRECISE CREDENCES IN INFERENCE AND DECISION MAKING1295 cited
  • 2010An Objective Justification of Bayesianism I: Measuring Inaccuracy247 cited
  • 2005How Probabilities Reflect Evidence239 cited
  • 2002The Rationality of Belief and Some Other Propositional Attitudes176 cited
  • 1996Dutch-Book Arguments Depragmatized: Epistemic Consistency For Partial Believers

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150 cited

Cited by

  • 2022Ignorance and Moral Responsibility42 cited
  • 2015The Accuracy and Rationality of Imprecise Credences33 cited
  • 2017When propriety is improper19 cited
  • 2018ACCURACY AND UR-PRIOR CONDITIONALIZATION19 cited
  • 2020Dilating and contracting arbitrarily19 cited
  • 2025A unified treatment of risk and ambiguity within a rank-dependent framework2 cited
  • 2025Taking Risks, With and Without Probabilities1 cited