Expertise and Contingent Fees: The Role of Asymmetric Information in Attorney Compensation

Kathryn E. Spier

163 citations0/0 files storedThe Journal of Law Economics and Organization

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Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems Legal principles and applications Legal and Constitutional Studies

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James D. Dana, Jr, Kathryn E. Spier; Expertise and Contingent Fees: The Role of Asymmetric Information in Attorney Compensation, The Journal of Law, Econom

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1993Economics, Organization and Management.1987Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives 1974Economic Analysis of Law 1957The Theory of Monopolistic Competition 1987The theory of contracts 1986Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms 1987Competition for Agency Contracts

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1999Economic Analysis of Law 1995The Economics of Breakdowns, Checkups, and Cures 2007Chapter 4 Litigation 2003Aligning the Interests of Lawyers and Clients 2001The Structure and Conduct of Corporate Lobbying: How Firms Lobby the Federal Communications Commission 2001The Structure and Conduct of Corporate Lobbying: How Firms Lobby the Federal Communications Commission 2000Expertise, contingent fees, and insufficient attorney effort 1997Delegation in contests

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