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How to Sell a (Bankrupt) Company
16 references·0 citing·39 second hop
How to Sell a (Bankrupt) Company (2012)How to Sell a (Bankrupt) CompanyToeholds and Takeovers (1999)Toeholds and TakeoversWhy Higher Takeover Premia Protect Minority Shareholders (1998)Why Higher Takeover Premia Pr…Optimal Debt Structure and the Number of Creditors (1996)Optimal Debt Structure and th…Insider Ownership and the Decision to Go Public (1995)Insider Ownership and the Dec…The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform (1992)The Economics of Bankruptcy R…An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting (1992)An Incomplete Contracts Appro…The Losses Realized in Bank Failures (1991)The Losses Realized in Bank F…Bankruptcy, boards, banks, and blockholders (1990)Bankruptcy, boards, banks, an…One share-one vote and the market for corporate control (1988)One share-one vote and the ma…The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations (1986)The Uneasy Case for Corporate…Large Shareholders and Corporate Control (1986)Large Shareholders and Corpor…Bidding for Contracts: A Principal-Agent Analysis (1986)Bidding for Contracts: A Prin…Auctions and Bidding (1986)Auctions and BiddingA comparison of equity carve-outs and seasoned equity offerings (1986)A comparison of equity carve-…Optimal Auction Design (1981)Optimal Auction DesignTakeover Bids, The Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation (1980)Takeover Bids, The Free-Rider…Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure (1976)Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm (1980)Separation of Ownership and Control (1983)Boards of Directors as an Endogenously Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature (2000)The Glass Cliff: Evidence that Women are Over‐Represented in Precarious Leadership Positions (2005)Corporate Social Responsibility as a Conflict Between Shareholders (2010)Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control (1965)The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive-Signalling Approach (1977)A Survey of Corporate Governance (1997)Corporate Ownership Around the World (1999)On financial contracting (1979)Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice between Informed and Arm's-Length Debt (1992)Liquidation Values and Debt Capacity: A Market Equilibrium Approach (1992)Relationship Banking: What Do We Know? (2000)Liquidity Risk, Liquidity Creation, and Financial Fragility: A Theory of Banking (2001)Information Asymmetry and Financing Arrangements: Evidence from Syndicated Loans (2007)COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS (1961)A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding (1982)Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading (1983)The interdisciplinary study of coordination (1994)INFORMATIONAL ASYMMETRIES, FINANCIAL STRUCTURE, AND FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION (1977)Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation (1999)Initial Public Offerings: An Analysis of Theory and Practice (2006)Theft and taxes☆ (2007)The market for corporate control (1983)Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers (1986)Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers (1996)Design and Valuation of Debt Contracts (1996)Access to Collateral and Corporate Debt Structure: Evidence from a Natural Experiment (2013)Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have (1984)Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure (1995)What Do We Know about Capital Structure? Some Evidence from International Data (1995)Game Theory and Economic Modelling (1990)Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature (1999)Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations (2009)Law and Finance (1998)Venture capital and the structure of capital markets: banks versus stock markets (1998)The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems (1999)The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins (2008)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1986Large Shareholders and Corporate Control8,403 cited
  • 1981Optimal Auction Design5,938 cited
  • 1980Takeover Bids, The Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation3,093 cited
  • 1986Auctions and Bidding2,253 cited
  • 1992An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting2,132 cited
  • 1996Optimal Debt Structure and the Number of Creditors1,440 cited
  • 1988One share-one vote and the market for corporate control1,342 cited
  • 1990Bankruptcy, boards, banks, and blockholders1,087 cited
  • 1995Insider Ownership and the Decision to Go Public874 cited
  • 1992The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform593 cited
  • 1986Bidding for Contracts: A Principal-Agent Analysis423 cited
  • 1991The Losses Realized in Bank Failures416 cited
  • 1999Toeholds and Takeovers388 cited
  • 1986The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations368 cited
  • 1986A comparison of equity carve-outs and seasoned equity offerings362 cited
  • 1998Why Higher Takeover Premia Protect Minority Shareholders354 cited

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