The Comparative Law and Economics of Judicial Councils

Nuno M. Garoupa

45 citations0/0 files storedTexas A&M Law Scholarship (Texas A&M University School of Law)

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Judicial and Constitutional Studies Legal and Constitutional Studies Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems

Abstract

In recent decades, many countries around the world have institutionalized judicial councils, institutions designed to enhance judicial independence and accountability. Our paper, the first comparative inquiry into this phenomenon, has two aims. First, we provide an economic theory of the formation of judicial councils and identify some of the dimensions along which they differ. Second, we discuss the national experience of several legal systems in light of our theory.

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