THE ATTACK‐AND‐DEFENSE GROUP CONTESTS: BEST SHOT VERSUS WEAKEST LINK

Subhasish M. Chowdhury · Iryna Topolyan

39 citations0/0 files storedEconomic Inquiry

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Game Theory and Applications Merger and Competition Analysis Game Theory and Voting Systems

Abstract

This study analyzes a group contest in which one group (defenders) follows a weakest link, whereas the other group (attackers) follows a best shot impact function (IF). We fully characterize the Nash and coalition‐proof equilibria and show that with symmetric valuation the coalition‐proof equilibrium is unique up to the permutation of the identity of the active player in the attacker group. With asymmetric valuation, it is always an equilibrium for one of the highest valuation players to be active; it may also be the case that the highest valuation players in the attacker group free‐ride completely on a group member with a lower valuation. However, in any equilibrium, only one player in the attacker group is active, whereas all the players in the defender group are active and exert the same effort. We also characterize the Nash and coalition‐proof equilibria for the case in which one group follows either a best shot or a weakest link but the other group follows an additive IF. (JELC72, D70, D72, D74, H41)

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References

1965The Logic of Collective Action 1966The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups.1982Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society 1986On the private provision of public goods 1996The all-pay auction with complete information 1983From weakest-link to best-shot: The voluntary provision of public goods 1984Dragon-slaying and ballroom dancing: The private supply of a public good 1961Uncertainty, Learning, and the Economics of Parallel Research and Development Efforts

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2018Revisiting the form and function of conflict: Neurobiological, psychological, and cultural mechanisms for attack and defense within and between groups 2016The Max-Min Group Contest: Weakest-link (Group) All-Pay Auction 2016Private-information group contests: Best-shot competition 2021Political games of attack and defence 2021The Economics of Identity and Conflict

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