Presidential Power and the Judicialization of Politics as Determinants of Institutional Change in the Judiciary: The Supreme Court of Ecuador (1979‐2009)

Abstract

What explains institutional instability in national judicial institutions? Much extant research focuses on de facto institutional instability, emphasizing political motivations behind irregular changes to high court composition. In contrast, I consider the causes for de jure changes made to the Ecuadorian Supreme Court from 1979 to the present, drawing on qualitative and quantitative analyses. I contend that the judicialization of politics and presidential interest in stacking the courts are central explanatory factors, and that changes to the Supreme Court's institutional framework reflect implicit compromises and political arrangements negotiated by strategic political actors. As such, institutional reforms to national judicial institutions may be adopted to ameliorate conflict in the larger political sphere. Related Articles:“Constitutional Jurisdiction and the Consolidation of Democracy.” (2009) http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747‐1346.2008.00159.x/abstract “Political and Economic Liberty in Latin America: Can They Coexist?” (2004) http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747‐1346.2004.tb00179.x/abstract “The Impact of Divided Government on the Supreme Court Appointment Process.” (2011) http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1747‐1346.2011.00325.x/abstract ¿Qué factores explican la inestabilidad institucional en los Poderes Judiciales nacionales? Al respecto, la mayoría de investigaciones focalizan en la inestabilidad institucional de facto, enfatizando en las motivaciones políticas que llevan a cambios en la composición de las cortes. En contraste, y recurriendo a un análisis cualitativo y cuantitativo, este artículo analiza las causas de los cambios de jure realizados en la Corte Suprema de Justicia del Ecuador desde 1979 hasta la fecha. El artículo propone que la judicialización de la política y el interés de los presidentes por controlar las cortes son los factores clave que explican tales cambios institucionales y que dichas variaciones en la Corte Suprema reflejan compromisos implícitos y acuerdos negociados por actores políticos estratégicos. Por tanto, las reformas institucionales a las cortes se adoptan a fin de aminorar el conflicto político suscitado en una esfera política más amplia.

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