From particularism to defeasibility in ethics

Abstract

A number of theorists have recently urged that the moral principles so prized by many are in fact irreducibly strewn with exceptions.1 Lying is always wrong-making – well, not when playing the game Diplomacy, in which lying is the point of the game, or again when confronted with the Nazi concentration camp guards, to whom the truth is not owed. Pleasure is always good-making – well, not when it is the pain enjoyed by the sadist, delighting in his victim’s agony.2 It is always wrong-making not to take competent agents at their word; well, not in the S&M room, where ‘no’ precisely does mean ‘yes’.

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