THE RATCHETING‐UP EFFECT

Vanessa Carbonell

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Philosophical Ethics and Theory Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Ethics, Aesthetics, and Art

Abstract

Abstract I argue for the existence of a ‘ratcheting‐up effect’: the behavior of moral saints serves to increase the level of moral obligation the rest of us face. What we are morally obligated to do is constrained by what it would be reasonable for us to believe we are morally obligated to do. Moral saints provide us with a special kind of evidence that bears on what we can reasonably believe about our obligations. They do this by modeling the level of sacrifice a person can realistically bear. Exposure to moral saints thus ‘ratchets‐up’ our obligations by combating a type of ignorance that would otherwise defeat those obligations.

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References

1982Moral Saints 1997Immanuel Kant Critique of Practical Reason 1996Living High and Letting Die 1959Essays in Moral Philosophy.1975Preference and Urgency 2007The Second-Person Standpoint 1991Well-Being: Its Meaning, Measurement and Moral Importance.2002Welfare and Rational Care

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