Substances Without Substrata

Abstract

L he present paper is to be thought of as part of an investigation into nature of individuals. I shall in part be concerned to refute what I shall call doctrine of simple individuals or bare particulars. This doctrine is to all intents and purposes identical with Locke's doctrine of Unknowable Substratum but there may be people who would subscribe to some form of a doctrine of simple individuals who would nevertheless claim not to be follow ing Locke. The doctrine in question I shall express as follows: An individual is what is independently of whatever properties happen to inhere in it, or, identity of an individual in no way depends on its The doctrine is involved in any refer ence to the individual apart from its properties. The doctrine of simple individuals runs parallel to rather less subterranean doctrine of simple qualities according to which, presumably, a quality is what is quite independently of its instances. These two doctrines jointly underlie a good part of philosophy of logical atomism and I may say that this philosophy seems to me to be profoundly wrong. The doctrine of simple individuals has its equal and opposite reaction in view that an individual is simply a bundle of properties, that identity of an individual is entirely dependent on identity of its This view also seems to me to be in some sense wrong and I shall attack in passing. If all my remarks have seemed excessively polemical is because I have been anxious to make as clear as possible what motivation behind this paper is. I am mainly concerned with problem concerning it which underlies or has properties and I shall

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 273 citations exist upstream.