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Sharing Default Information as a Borrower Discipline Device · Study

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PreprintSharing Default Information as a Borrower Discipline Device

Jorge A. Padilla2000

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Preprintgreen2000

Sharing Default Information as a Borrower Discipline Device

Jorge A. Padilla · Marco Pagano

62 citations·0/0 files stored·SSRN Electronic Journal

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Banking stability, regulation, efficiency Credit Risk and Financial Regulations Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems

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References

1991Monitoring and Reputation: The Choice between Bank Loans and Directly Placed Debt 1990Asymmetric Information, Bank Lending and Implicit Contracts: A Stylized Model of Customer Relationships 1990Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities 1989Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets 1994Monotone Comparative Statics 1989Further evidence on the bank lending process and the capital-market response to bank loan agreements 1993Information Sharing in Credit Markets 1995Arm's Length Relationships

Cited by

2000Information Sharing in Credit Markets: The European Experience 2002Competition and Stability in Banking 2019Non-performing Loan and its Effects on Banking Stability: Evidence from National and International Licensed Banks in Nigeria 2010Bankruptcy: Is it Enough to Forgive or Must We Also Forget?2008Distance, Lending Technologies and Interest Rates 2009Sharing Information in the Credit Market: Contract-Level Evidence from U.S. Firms

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2000Sharing default information as a borrower discipline devicearticle · 6 shared references 2003Financial Intermediationchapter · 5 shared references 2001Les relations bancaires de long termearticle · 5 shared references 2002Are There Bank Effects in Borrowers' Costs of Funds? Evidence from a Matched Sample of Borrowers and Banksarticle · 4 shared references 2002Financial Intermediationreport · 4 shared references 2013Information Sharing and Information Acquisition in Credit Marketsarticle · 4 shared references

Details

Year2000

Typepreprint

Published2000-01-01

VenueSSRN Electronic Journal

ISSN-L1556-5068

Languageen

Citations62

Files0 public / 0

ShelfBanking stability, regulation, efficiency

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doi10.2139/ssrn.183972

openalex_workW1869996019

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2009The Real Effect of Foreign Banks

2020Application of Big Data Technology in Insurance Innovation