Article2015

Director Liability Protection, Earnings Management, and Audit Pricing

15 citations0/0 files storedJournal of Empirical Legal Studies

No readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.

No open-access location is known for this record yet.

Literature note Cite in a project Citation map

Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance Corporate Finance and Governance Corporate Governance and Financial Management

Abstract

We examine how a firm's director liability protection is related to earnings management and audit pricing. Firms whose directors are protected from litigation either by state laws or through clauses in the firm's charter have significantly more accruals management. This relation is significant after the passage of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act but not before. We also find evidence of a positive association between director protection and auditor fees. The results are robust to a number of alternative specifications, including one that instruments for director liability protection.

Paper brief

Loading…

Cite this work

Citation unavailable for this work.

BibTeX RIS CSL-JSON

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Citations in this library

Citation map →

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 15 citations exist upstream.

References

1983Limited-dependent and qualitative variables in econometrics 1991Earnings Management During Import Relief Investigations 2001Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the capital markets: A review of the empirical disclosure literature 2005Performance matched discretionary accrual measures 2005The economic implications of corporate financial reporting 2003Corporate Governance and Equity Prices 2003Earnings Management through Real Activities Manipulation 1983Agency Problems and Residual Claims

Explore the map →

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.

Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.