Voluntary Pension Saving for Old Age: Are the Objectives of Self‐responsibility and Security Compatible?

Abstract

Abstract Fiscal pressure and demographic change lead governments to seek ways of reducing state expenditure on pensions. Individuals are asked to take more responsibility, and funded, supplementary pension schemes have been established in many countries. This article looks at schemes that are voluntary – the NEST or Personal Accounts scheme in Britain and the Riester Pension scheme in Germany. It examines the debate about whether it is worthwhile for some people to participate in pension schemes that are not mandatory – particularly those with low incomes and/or potentially broken careers. The small pensions they accumulate in such schemes merely offset entitlements to means‐tested pension benefits, leaving them no better off in old age. Concerns about the behavioural consequences of pension means‐testing are not new. Nonetheless, few policymakers have been willing to look at when and how such concerns were expressed in the context of voluntary pension savings. Equally, they have seldom been prepared to explain the costs involved in guaranteeing savings‐based pensions or the implications that the lack of offering such a guarantee might have for individual behaviour. The state has sought for people to take greater ‘self‐responsibility’ for their retirement income, but many people wish for some certainty with respect to the pensions they can expect. These goals might well be in conflict. Whether the ‘state pension for the 21st century’, as proposed by the UK government, will succeed in satisfying the objectives both of the state and of pension savers remains an open question.

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