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How Important are Risk-Taking Incentives in Executive Compensation? · Study

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PreprintHow Important are Risk-Taking Incentives in Executive Compensation?

Ingolf Dittmann A2008

OA

Preprintgreen2008

How Important are Risk-Taking Incentives in Executive Compensation?

Ingolf Dittmann A · Ko-Chia Yu · Dan Zhang

51 citations·0/0 files stored·SSRN Electronic Journal

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Corporate Finance and Governance Accounting and Organizational Management Stochastic processes and financial applications

Abstract

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Citations in this library

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 51 citations exist upstream.

References

1992Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty 1996Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers 1979Moral Hazard and Observability 1991Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design 1985The Determinants of Firms' Hedging Policies 2005Managerial incentives and risk-taking☆2008What Matters in Corporate Governance?1983An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem

Cited by

2015Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer 2012Risk-shifting and the regulation of bank CEOs’ compensation 2011What determines stock option contract design?2013Corporate Governance and the Cost of Borrowing 2013Internal versus external CEO choice and the structure of compensation contracts 2009Dynamic Incentive Accounts

Details

Year2008

Typepreprint

Published2008-01-01

VenueSSRN Electronic Journal

ISSN-L1556-5068

Languageen

Citations51

Files0 public / 0

ShelfCorporate Finance and Governance

Identifiers

doi10.2139/ssrn.1176192

openalex_workW1892980290

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