Aristotle's Philosophy of Soul

Abstract

DEBATE CONTINUES OVER WHETHER AN Aristotelian philosophy of is still credible.(1) Recent commentators wonder whether Aristotle's view lies somewhere in the constellation of modern theories of mind, or whether he might point to an uncharted theory. Because he viewed his own as an alternative to both Platonic dualism and Presocratic materialism, moderns seeking a middle way between Cartesian dualism and reductionist physicalism have looked to Aristotle for inspiration. As Jonathan Barnes observes, Philosophy of mind has for centuries been whirled between a Cartesian Charybdis and a scientific Scylla: Aristotle has the look of an Odysseus.(2) The interpretation of Aristotle is problematic because he discusses what moderns call mental phenomena in the context of his own philosophy of soul ([GREEK TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]), which has certain distinctive features. Because he viewed soul as a principle of life, he saw nothing odd about a plant having a soul, although he would have dismissed as absurd the suggestion that a complicated artifact might have a soul. In contrast, many modern philosophers think that computers have as much a claim to consciousness as humans; but the idea that plants have a secret mental life strikes moderns as bizarre. Moreover, certain problems might not have the centrality for Aristotle which they have for moderns: for example, he would not regard qualia and intentionality as necessary features of psychic states, because plants and lower animals do not exhibit them. Also, modern controversies involve notions such as reducibility and scientific laws which lack clear correlates in Aristotle. In view of all this it might be concluded that Aristotle's psychology is sui generis or incommensurable with modern theories of mind. Yet such difficulties are unavoidable whenever one philosopher tries to understand another with a different conceptual scheme. We may be able to offer a plausible reconstruction of Aristotle's psychology by drawing on some of our own concepts. One method is to find counterparts in another framework to concepts of our own: even when there are different conceptual distinctions and interconnections, we still may be able to detect important overall similarities between the two networks of ideas. It would, of course, be incredible and suspicious if such a reconstruction turned out to resemble any modern concept of mind too closely. But this technique might shed valuable light on Aristotle's theory or modern theories or both. In using the method of reconstruction, however, let us not forget that what we think of as Aristotle's philosophy of mind is only part of what he would have thought of as his philosophy of soul. We should not emulate Heinrich Schliemann ploughing headlong through the mound of Hissarlik in pursuit of Priam's Troy. We should try to respect and understand the broader framework to which Aristotle's discussions of mind belong. I A satisfactory exegesis of Aristotle's philosophy of soul must pay close attention to De Anima 2.1, where he says that he is trying to determine what is the soul and what is the common of the soul.(3) By most common account ([GREEK TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]), he evidently means the inclusive account, an of what souls of all kinds have in common.(4) Although his discussion is very abstract, we may reasonably expect it to set parameters of a defensible interpretation. This of the soul has two interrelated stages: in the first the soul is an actualization,(5) and in the second it is an essence.(6) The first stage begins with the category of substance ([GREEK TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]), which is distinguished into three types: (1) matter, which is intrinsically or in itself not a this ([GREEK TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]); (2) shape or form, through which we call something a this; and (3) the composite of matter and form. …

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