Chance and Counterfactuals

John T. Hawthorne

109 citations0/0 files storedPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research

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Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Philosophy and Theoretical Science Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge

Abstract

Suppose the world is chancy. The worry arises that most ordinary counterfactuals are false. This paper examines David Lewis' strategy for rescuing such counterfactuals, and argues that it is highly problematic.

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1972Subjective probability: A judgment of representativeness 2002Knowledge and its Limits 1979Counterfactual Dependence and Time's Arrow 2003Knowledge and Lotteries 2005KNOWLEDGE AND LOTTERIES 1987Philosophical Papers Volume II 1982Subjective probability: A judgment of representativeness

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2006A GRADABLE APPROACH TO DISPOSITIONS 2012Subjunctive Credences and Semantic Humility 2017Will done Better: Selection Semantics, Future Credence, and Indeterminacy 2017Agentive Modals 2008I-Counterfactuals 2011Dispositions, Conditionals, and Counterexamples 2016Probabilities of conditionals in context 2020Contra counterfactism

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