No open-access location is known for this record yet.
No open-access location is known for this record yet.
This chapter considers an epistemological argument from disagreement which concludes that many of most people’s moral beliefs do not amount to knowledge (even if there are moral facts of the matter and some people are tracking them). Various ways of understanding the argument are considered and it is argued that each relies on an epistemic principle that is under-motivated, overgeneralizes, and is indeed self-incriminating. These problems, it is suggested, infect many conciliationist theses in the epistemology of disagreement. Knowledge, it is argued, can withstand not only acknowledged peer disagreement, but also disagreement with the acknowledged experts. If this is right, then the sort of epistemic principle that is required to move from moral disagreement to the conclusion that many of most people’s moral beliefs do not amount to knowledge has landed well off the mark.
Loading…
Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.