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Conditional Oughts and Hypothetical Imperatives
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  • 2008Means-end coherence, stringency, and subjective reasons181 cited
  • 2004The Scope of Instrumental Reason153 cited
  • 2010Ought , Agents, and Actions145 cited
  • 2004Brute Rationality145 cited
  • 2008Defending the wide-scope approach to instrumental reason126 cited
  • 2008The Myth of Practical Consistency117 cited
  • 2016What You’re Rationally Required to Do and What You Ought to Do (Are the Same Thing!)98 cited
  • 1978Doing the Best One Can97 cited
  • 2004Brute rationality normativity and human action85 cited
  • 2003Moore, Normativity, and Intrinsic Value73 cited
  • 2002Practical Reality62 cited
  • 2009What ought probably means, and why you can’t detach it55 cited
  • 2010The Normativity of Rationality54 cited
  • 2020Rational Powers in Action50 cited
  • 2020Instrumental Rationality48 cited

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