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Games of Capacity Manipulation in Hospital-intern Markets
16 references·3 citing·26 second hop
Games of Capacity Manipulation in Hospital-intern Markets (2006)Games of Capacity Manipulation in Hospita…School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach (2003)School Choice: A Mechanism De…Core in a simple coalition formation game (2001)Core in a simple coalition fo…Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange (2000)Strategyproof Assignment by H…A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student Placement (1999)A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Stu…Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems (1998)Random Serial Dictatorship an…Monotone Comparative Statics (1994)Monotone Comparative StaticsTwo Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis. (1992)Two Sided Matching: A Study i…Two-Sided Matching (1990)Two-Sided MatchingRandom Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching (1990)Random Paths to Stability in …The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem (1985)The college admissions proble…Some remarks on the stable matching problem (1985)Some remarks on the stable ma…The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory (1984)The Evolution of the Labor Ma…The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives (1982)The Economics of Matching: St…Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm (1981)Machiavelli and the Gale-Shap…College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage (1962)College Admissions and the St…The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic DesignThe Redesign of the Matching …Fair Matching under Constraints: Theory and Applications (2023)Fair Matching under Constrain…Optimal Truncation in Matching Markets (2013)Optimal Truncation in Matchin…Imperfect competition in two-sided matching markets (2013)Imperfect competition in two-…Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result (1973)Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions (1975)Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match (2009)61. Capitalism and Freedom (2002)Matching and Sorting in Online Dating (2010)The Combinatorial Assignment Problem: Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes (2011)College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage (1962)Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes (1982)Social Theory, Social Research, and a Theory of Action (1986)Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term (1995)Predicting How People Play Games: Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria (1998)Pairwise kidney exchange (2005)Algorithmics of Matching Under Preferences (2012)Information Technology, Workplace Organization and the Demand for Skilled Labor: Firm-Level Evidence (1999)Incentives versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement Contracts (2001)The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation, and Politics (2009)A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks (1996)Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations (2009)Contrasting Computational Models of Mate Preference Integration Across 45 Countries (2019)Matching with Contracts (2005)Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market (1993)The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework (1999)The New York City High School Match (2005)Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets (2007)The Evolution of Social and Economic Networks (2002)The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures (2002)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1962College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage5,978 cited
  • 1992Two Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis.1,625 cited
  • 2003School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach1,572 cited
  • 1994Monotone Comparative Statics1,571 cited
  • 1990Two-Sided Matching1,377 cited
  • 1984The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory1,217 cited
  • 1982The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives897 cited
  • n.d.The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design757 cited
  • 1981Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm655 cited
  • 1998Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems612 cited
  • 1999A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student Placement567 cited
  • 2001Core in a simple coalition formation game528 cited
  • 1985The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem467 cited
  • 1985Some remarks on the stable matching problem431 cited
  • 1990Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching355 cited
  • 2000

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Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
353 cited

Cited by

  • 2013Optimal Truncation in Matching Markets55 cited
  • 2023Fair Matching under Constraints: Theory and Applications55 cited
  • 2013Imperfect competition in two-sided matching markets52 cited