Migration Decisions Within Dual‐Earner Partnerships: A Test of Bargaining Theory

Abstract

This article focuses on the problems faced by dual‐earner partnerships arising from the regional coordination of the partners' careers. It is still unknown whether the fact that couples are less mobile than singles is caused by homogeneous preferences within couples or by a process of balancing conflicting interests. Consequently, we analyze the potential conflicts provoked by work‐related migration incentives. We test hypotheses derived from bargaining theory using quasi‐experimental data from a factorial survey of nearly 280 European couples. Our results support the bargaining approach and confirm that asymmetrical shifts in bargaining power drive the potential for conflict. Women's willingness to move is generally less than men's, but the impact of employment prospects differs only slightly by gender.

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