Articlegreen2009

A framed field experiment on collective enforcement mechanisms with Ethiopian farmers

Anke Reichhuber · Eva Camacho-Cuena · Till Requate

28 citations0/0 files storedEnvironment and Development Economics

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Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies Conservation, Biodiversity, and Resource Management Socioeconomics of Resources and Conservation

Abstract

ABSTRACT We present the results of a framed field experiment with Ethiopian farmers that use the mountain rain forest as a common pool resource. Harvesting honey causes damage to the forest, and open access leads to over-harvesting. We test different mechanisms for mitigating excessive harvesting: a collective tax with low and high tax rates, and a tax/subsidy system. We find that the high-tax scheme works best in inducing the desired level of harvesting, while the tax-subsidy scheme may trigger tacit collusion. Via a panel data analysis we further investigate which variables influence the subjects' decisions during the treatments.

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References

1990Governing the Commons 1992Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action 1982Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma 2004Field Experiments 2004Social Comparisons and Pro-social Behavior: Testing “Conditional Cooperation” in a Field Experiment 1988Uncertainty and incentives for nonpoint pollution control 2000Local Environmental Control and Institutional Crowding-Out 2004What do people bring into the game? Experiments in the field about cooperation in the commons

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