Power Politics in Foreign Policy:

Abstract

Scholars of foreign policy-making have concentrated on how the most powerful domestic actors influence foreign policy and have largely ignored the influence of less powerful, minority actors. This article argues that bureaucratic minorities — subordinates and less powerful departments — can and do influence foreign policy. Despite the extensive scholarship on bureaucratic politics and the central importance of `power' in the theory, we know little about the nature and effects of asymmetrical power relations. Drawing from various research, this article proposes that bureaucratic minorities can adopt strategies based on rewards and costs, manipulation of decision procedures, and information to bypass or exploit their status to influence policy. The choice and effectiveness of these strategies may depend on whether or not the actor is a vertical minority (a subordinate influencing a superior) or a horizontal minority (a representative from a less powerful department influencing other departments). Further investigations of the conditions under which minority players have influence can be part of a much needed revival of the bureaucratic politics perspective on foreign policy-making.

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 84 citations exist upstream.

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.