Rapporteurs as legislative entrepreneurs: the dynamics of the codecision procedure in Europe's parliament

Abstract

Recent literature on the European Parliament has focused on its powers arising from the co-operation and codecision procedures, although little attention has been paid as to who exercises this power. Rapporteurs are appointed to draft parliamentary reports on proposed legislation during the committee stages before presenting them to the plenary, negotiating across political groups and with the Commission and Council in order to maximize consensus and the influence of Parliament if inter-institutional bargaining takes place.;>Case studies contribute to an analysis of the role of rapporteurs. The extent to which rapporteur self-selection occurs, according to the specific preferences of potential rapporteurs, is also assessed. This allows us to conclude which parties and nationalities value the allocation of reports and consequently have an impact on the content of European legislation.

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