Long-Run Effects of Foreign Penetration on Privatization Policies

Susumu Cato · Toshihiro Matsumura

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Global trade and economics International Business and FDI Merger and Competition Analysis

Abstract

This paper investigates the long-run effect of foreign penetration in product markets on privatization policies. We find that the optimal degree of privatization is increasing in foreign penetration. This result is in sharp contrast to the existing short-run result that it is decreasing. Our result suggests that from a long-run viewpoint, the country with a more open market should promote the privatization of public enterprises, even though this reduces welfare in the short run.

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References

1987The Strategic Choice of Managerial Incentives 1998Partial privatization in mixed duopoly 1985Managerial incentives as a strategic variable in duopolistic environment 2006Partial Privatization, Foreign Competition, and Optimum Tariff*2005R&D competition between public and private sectors

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2019Corporate social responsibility and privatization policy in a mixed oligopoly 2015Cournot–Bertrand comparison in a mixed oligopoly 2015Competition and privatization policies revisited: the payoff interdependence approach 2015Optimal Privatisation and Trade Policies with Endogenous Market Structure

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