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The source of value of voting rights and related dividend promises
16 references·5 citing·34 second hop
The source of value of voting rights and related dividend promises (2002)The source of value of voting rights and …Takeover bids and the relative prices of shares that differ in their voting rights (1996)Takeover bids and the relativ…What Determines the Value of Corporate Votes? (1995)What Determines the Value of …Shark Repellents and Managerial Myopia: An Empirical Test (1990)Shark Repellents and Manageri…Consolidating corporate control (1990)Consolidating corporate contr…Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value (1990)Additional evidence on equity…Managers' voting rights and corporate control (1989)Managers' voting rights and c…The effect of poison pill securities on shareholder wealth (1988)The effect of poison pill sec…Managerial control of voting rights (1988)Managerial control of voting …Management ownership and market valuation (1988)Management ownership and mark…Dual-class recapitalizations as antitakeover mechanisms (1988)Dual-class recapitalizations …Managerial ownership of voting rights (1985)Managerial ownership of votin…The Market Value of Differential Voting Rights in Closely Held Corporations (1984)The Market Value of Different…Voting in Corporate Law (1983)Voting in Corporate LawThe market value of control in publicly-traded corporations (1983)The market value of control i…The market for corporate control (1983)The market for corporate cont…Economic Evaluation of Voting Power of Common Stock (1983)Economic Evaluation of Voting…Does the dual-class share structure help stock markets attract issuers? Empirical lessons from global financial centres (2022)Does the dual-class share str…Staggered Boards and the Value of Voting Rights (2021)Staggered Boards and the Valu…A review of the literature on dual-class firms (2019)A review of the literature on…The relevance of tag along rights and identity of controlling shareholders for the price spreads between dual-class shares: the brazilian case (2010)The relevance of tag along ri…The Value of Voting Rights to Majority Shareholders: Evidence from Dual Class Stock Unifications (2003)The Value of Voting Rights to…Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure (1976)Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers (1986)Large Shareholders and Corporate Control (1986)A Survey of Corporate Governance (1997)Corporate Ownership Around the World (1999)The theory and practice of corporate finance: evidence from the field (2001)Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. (1976)Separation of Ownership and Control (1983)Finance and Growth: Theory and Evidence (2004)Dominant shareholders, corporate boards, and corporate value: A cross-country analysis (2007)Agency Problems at Dual‐Class Companies (2009)Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm (1980)Law and Finance (1998)Takeover Bids, The Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation (1980)One share-one vote and the market for corporate control (1988)How do family ownership, control and management affect firm value? (2005)Inherited Control and Firm Performance (2006)The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment (1958)Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors (1996)Founding‐Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from the S&P 500 (2003)The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences (1985)Majority owner-managers and organizational efficiency (1994)Block ownership and firm-specific information (2008)Employee well-being, firm leverage, and bankruptcy risk (2009)Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization (1996)Governance and bank valuation (2007)How Are U.S. Family Firms Controlled? (2008)Family Control of Firms and Industries (2009)The Value of Corporate Votes and Control Benefits: A Cross-Country Analysis (2000)Vote Trading and Information Aggregation (2007)Poison pill securities (1988)Corporate Governance: Effects on Firm Performance and Economic Growth (2002)The effects of behavioural factors in investment decision-making: a survey of institutional investors operating at the Nairobi Stock Exchange (2008)Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review (1989)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1988Management ownership and market valuation6,910 cited
  • 1990Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value4,311 cited
  • 1983The market for corporate control4,145 cited
  • 1988Managerial control of voting rights2,441 cited
  • 1985Managerial ownership of voting rights659 cited
  • 1995What Determines the Value of Corporate Votes?598 cited
  • 1988The effect of poison pill securities on shareholder wealth364 cited
  • 1983The market value of control in publicly-traded corporations359 cited
  • 1983Voting in Corporate Law334 cited
  • 1989Managers' voting rights and corporate control262 cited
  • 1988Dual-class recapitalizations as antitakeover mechanisms235 cited
  • 1983Economic Evaluation of Voting Power of Common Stock198 cited
  • 1990Shark Repellents and Managerial Myopia: An Empirical Test188 cited
  • 1984The Market Value of Differential Voting Rights in Closely Held Corporations153 cited
  • 1996Takeover bids and the relative prices of shares that differ in their voting rights151 cited
  • 1990Consolidating corporate control

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145 cited

Cited by

  • 2003The Value of Voting Rights to Majority Shareholders: Evidence from Dual Class Stock Unifications40 cited
  • 2021Staggered Boards and the Value of Voting Rights25 cited
  • 2022Does the dual-class share structure help stock markets attract issuers? Empirical lessons from global financial centres16 cited
  • 2019A review of the literature on dual-class firms15 cited
  • 2010The relevance of tag along rights and identity of controlling shareholders for the price spreads between dual-class shares: the brazilian case14 cited