VOLUNTARY AUDITS IN NEW YORK MARKETS IN 1927: A CASE STUDY

Barbara Dubis Merino · Alan G. Mayper · Ram S. Sriram

20 citations0/0 files storedJournal of Business Finance &amp Accounting

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Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance Corporate Finance and Governance Accounting Theory and Financial Reporting

Abstract

This study examines the demand for audits in the pre‐SEC period in the United States. We focus on three hypotheses ‐ monitoring, information, and capital formation ‐ to test the economic incentives prior researchers have posited led to demand for audits. We compare a sample of companies traded in three non‐NYSE markets (unregulated) to a sample of NYSE listed companies (regulated). We found that the need to raise capital did increase use of audits, but that neither the monitoring nor information hypotheses explain this early demand. Common stock ratings appeared to be a cost‐effective alternative to audits and we found little evidence that audits improved the quality of financial reports.

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1976Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure 1983Separation of Ownership and Control 1970Participation and Democratic Theory 1933The Modern Corporation and Private Property 2017The Theory of Business Enterprise 1904Theory of Business Enterprise 1964Public Regulation of the Securities Markets 1933Other People's Money and How the Bankers Use It

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