The European Court of Justice as an agent of Europeanization? Restoring compliance with EU law

Abstract

Often, states incrementally adapt to demands stemming from the European Union. Yet, most of the prominent Europeanization approaches focus exclusively on immediate responses of states and are also static. If they theorize supranational actors as agents of top-down Europeanization at all, they do not specify scope conditions for their success. This article complements existing approaches in studying instances in which states do not meet European demands immediately (non-compliance). It analyses the role of the European Court of Justice in facilitating changes even against states' eminent resistance to top-down Europeanization. An empirical analysis shows that judgments and threats of sanctions are important for restoring compliance but are not always effective. This article theoretically accounts for this finding. Judgments create publicity and empower societal compliance proponents. This facilitates successful shaming or reframing strategies leading to catching up with Europeanization, if contested norms fit to institutionalized norms or if old policy frames are degenerating. Financial penalties are only effective if domestic societal resistance is weak and if the shadow of sanctions is intense. The hypotheses are illustrated with two environmental and social policy case studies in Germany.

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 95 citations exist upstream.

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.