Markov Equilibria of Stochastic Games with Complementarities

Laurent O. Curtat

101 citations0/0 files storedGames and Economic Behavior

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Game Theory and Applications Game Theory and Voting Systems Economic theories and models

Abstract

The existence of Markov equilibria for stochastic games with a continuum of states is a complex issue for which no general result holds as yet. In this article, the problem is solved for a class of stochastic games that satisfy assumptions of complementarity and monotonicity. The proof of existence relies on results from lattice programming. In the Markov equilibria singled out by the Theorem of Existence, the policies and continuation values are increasing and Lipschitz continuous functions of the state variable.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C62, C73.

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