Article2013

The Preponderance and Effects of Sectoral Ties in the StateDuma

25 citations0/0 files storedEurope Asia Studies

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Political Influence and Corporate Strategies Electoral Systems and Political Participation Russia and Soviet political economy

Abstract

The Russian State Duma has been the target of business interests since its inception in 1993. Using an original dataset, this article examines the economic sectors that have been most prominent over this period, and it considers different explanations—organisational, financial and reputational—for variation in their preponderance over time. It also assesses the effects of the sectoral ties of deputies on legislative activity. Through the analysis of 100 laws that were the focus of lobbying campaigns in the first four Dumas, it finds that the sectoral ties of deputies are a powerful predictor of several aspects of legislative behaviour.

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References

1965The Logic of Collective Action 1966The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups.1998Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform in Postcommunist Transitions 2000Without a map: political tactics and economic reform in Russia 1995How Russia became a market economy 2006Why Not Parties in Russia? Democracy, Federalism, and the State 2010Businessman Candidates 2006Why not parties in Russia?: democracy, federalism, and the state

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